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Making Sausage 
The Ninth Circuit's Opinion 
by Carl E. Schneider 
s I write, the Supreme 
Court has just agreed to 
hear Compassion in Dying 
v. Washington and Q}tiU u 
Vacco, the two cases in which United 
States circuit courts of appeals held 
that a state may not constitutionally 
prohibit physicians from helping a 
terminally ill person who wishes to 
commit suicide to do so. These cases 
have already received lavish comment 
and criticism, and no doubt the Su-
preme Court's opinion will garner 
even more. Reasonably enough, most 
of this analysis addresses the merits 
of physician-assisted suicide as social 
policy. I, here, want to talk about how 
setting bioethical policy through con-
stitutional adjudication actually works 
and how its usefulness is diminshed 
by some practical deficiencies. 
Courts are often thought well-
equipped to resolve social issues be-
cause they are guided by the thought 
and wisdom that animated the Con-
stitution. Sometimes this argument 
has some truth. But bioethical ques-
tions are generally resolved under a 
provision (the Fourteenth Amend-
ment) that says only that no state shall 
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law." 
These words, noble though they are, 
give courts little insight and little di-
rection. The Supreme Court has been 
able to fmd in them such a suspi-
ciously wide range of lessons--from 
the unconstitutionality of statutes lim-
iting a woman's right to an abortion 
to the unconstitutionality of statutes 
limiting the hours an employee can 
be required to work-that one may 
begin to wonder just what the justices 
have been consulting. 
The vagueness of the Fourteenth 
Amendment throws judges back on 
their own resources. Because judges 
vary in experience and talent, these 
resources vary. But all judges are law-
yers. A lawyer's training is centrally 
about analyzing legal documents, par-
ticularly judicial opinions. It does lit-
tle, for example, to equip lawyers to 
understand and respect empirical evi-
dence about social behavior and does 
too much to convince them that the 
best evidence about how the world 
works is the particular facts of a liti-
gated case. The practice of law may 
remedy some of these ills, but today 
most sophisticated legal practice is too 
specialized to expose lawyers broadly 
to social issues. Yet once appointed, 
judges must become the broadest 
kinds of generalists. In short, judges 
are lawyers who-narrowly trained 
and narrowly experienced-are un-
likely to come to the extraordinary 
range of problems they face with ex-
pertise or understanding. 
What is worse, judges are less well 
situated to learn about these prob-
lems than one might expect True, 
the trial-court judge presides over 
proceedings in which evidence is in-
troduced. But a systematic flaw of 
constitutional adjudication is that it 
promulgates grand principles on the 
basis of a single case's facts. Courts 
tend to assume that the case before 
them typifies the social problem at is-
sue and that the parties before them 
represent all relevant points of view. 
And since the parties, not the judge, 
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decide what evidence will be intr~ 
duced, the judge does not hear what 
will not benefit the parties, and the 
quality of the information intr~ 
duced crucially depends on the wit 
and learning of the attorneys the 
Quinlans or the Cruzans happen to 
hire and of the too often modestly 
gifted political appointees and civil 
servants who represent state govern-
ments. To be sure, interested groups 
may file "friend of the court" briefs. 
But in my experience, appellate judges 
(at least) rarely read them. 
Suppose, though, that this hap-
hazard process leaves the federal trial 
judge well informed. That judge's de-
cision will only affect the people 
within that judge's district If several 
states are to be reached, the case must 
be presented to a circuit court of ap-
peals. If the whole country is to be 
reached, the case must be taken to the 
Supreme Court. Ironically, though, as 
the case's reach widens, the judge's 
contact with the evidence shrinks. 
The parties normally reprint only a 
few significant documents from the 
trial record for the appellate judges. 
And those judges typically do not 
read even these excerpts, much less 
ask to see the whole record. Rather, 
they read the parties' briefs and listen 
to their oral arguments. In the Su-
preme Court, briefs are limited to fifty 
pages and oral arguments to thirty 
minutes. 
Moreover, judges have little time to 
educate themselves, to reflect on a 
case, or to write an opinion. The 
courts of appeals are often egre-
giously far behind in their work. The 
Supreme Court takes only a limited 
number of cases each year (in addi-
tion to reviewing more than 5,000 re-
quests to hear cases), but the Court 
limits its docket to the most perplex-
ing and controversial statutory and 
constitutional cases that arise each 
year, and mastering them during the 
Court's nine-month term is, to say the 
least, challenging. 
To help them with this work, Su-
preme Court justices now commonly 
hire several clerks, most of whom 
graduated from law school a year pre-
viously. In the chambers of the justice 
for whom I clerked, the burden of the 
Court's work meant that cases were 
handled like this: The justice would 
read the parties' briefs in each case; 
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the three clerks divided the cases 
among them. Before oral argument, 
the clerks and the justice would dis-
cuss the cases. The justice would listen 
to the oral arguments, and the Court 
would deliberate and vote privately. If 
my justice was assigned to write an 
opinion, the clerk who had worked 
on the case would draft it. He had 
ten days in which to do so. In that 
time, he continued to read briefs and 
to write memoranda to the justice on 
the petitions to hear cases that kept 
pouring into the Court. When the 
clerk was finished drafting the opin-
ion, the justice would read it over and 
edit it lightly. 
I admired the lawyerly skills of the 
justice for whom I clerked. (I had less 
admiration for my own skills, one year 
out of law school.) But I think the 
practical deficiencies of making social 
policy through constitutional adjudi-
cation-the inexperience judges bring 
to a case, the improverished opportu-
nities they have for examining the 
case's social landscape, and the time 
pressures which harass them-are se-
vere and offer the most charitable ex-
planation for the regrettable quality 
of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Com-
passion in Dying. 
For example, the court in that case 
appears to have known little about 
medical decisions at the end of life. 
The court (perhaps influenced by the 
stories of the three plaintiffs who were 
patients) creates the impression that 
hospitals are awash in terminally ill 
patients driven to commit suicide by 
unendurable pain. It offers no indi-
cation of the numbers at stake, and 
growing evidence raises doubt that 
pain is the principal motivation of 
those requesting assisted suicide. The 
court "believe[d] that most, if not all, 
doctors would not assist a terminally 
ill patient to hasten his death as long 
as there were any reasonable chance 
of alleviating the patient's suffering or 
enabling him to live under tolerable 
conditions." Yet it has long been clear 
and has recently become clearer 
(through the SUPPORT study) that 
many doctors undertreat pain. The 
court "also believe[d] that physicians 
would not assist a patient to end his 
life if there were any significant doubt 
about the patient's true wishes." Yet 
the history of bioethics is in no small 
part a reaction to the sobering number 
of doctors who have not been driven 
to understand patients' wishes, who 
have not understood them, and who 
have ignored them even when they 
have understood them. The court dis-
misses out of hand the difficulty of 
defining "terminal," and seems inno-
cent of any awareness of how hard it 
can be to apply any such definition. 
The court's easy equation of with-
drawing treatment and assisted sui-
cide, and its peremptory rejection of 
the principle of double effect, may 
likewise be due to the court's need to 
make decisions with dangerously little 
learning, for the court gives scant 
sense of understanding the long and 
thoughtful ethical debate over these 
subjects. The court's refusal to con-
sider how far its reasoning carries be-
yond its ruling may have similar roots. 
The court explains that refusal by say-
ing that its task is to "decide only the 
issue before us." If this is true, it is 
another defect of constitutional adju-
dication as an instrument of social 
policy, for what could be more per-
verse in an area so pervaded by slip-
pery-slope problems than to prevent 
policymakers from considering where 
their decisions might lead? 
The court might have had to grap-
ple more seriously with its arguments 
had it been responsible for writing 
rules to govern its new regime of sui-
cide. But the court loftily confmed it-
self to general principles and airily 
dismissed the regulatory difficulties of 
that regime: ''we believe that suffi-
cient safeguards can and will be de-
veloped by the state and medical pro-
fession . . . to ensure that the possi-
bility of error will ordinarily be re-
mote." In light of the twenty-year 
struggle states have had with courts 
over regulating abortions, the Ninth 
Circuit's complacency is hard to ac-
count for (particularly since the court 
repeatedly and proudly cites the Su-
preme Court's latest major abortion 
decision, Planned Parenthood v. Casey). 
Finally, the deficiencies of constitu-
tional policymaking may help explain 
the Ninth Circuit's astonishing confi-
dence. Thus the court blandly an-
nounced that the Supreme Court's 
opinions in "Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey ... and Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Dept. of Health . . . are fully 
persuasive, and leave little doubt as to 
the proper result." 
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One virtue of resolving social dis-
putes judicially is supposed to be that 
judges are detached, disinterested, 
dispassionate observers who bring 
cool judgment to over-heated ques-
tions. But as judges become the trib-
unes of the people, they may be hard-
pressed to sustain that moderation 
and calm. Judge Reinhardt's opinion, 
for instance, is disfigured by his con-
tempt for those who have affronted 
him with their disagreement. He 
characterizes their arguments as "dis-
ingenuous," "meretricious," "ludi-
crous," "nihilistic," and "inflamma-
tory." He then piously concludes by 
hoping "that whatever debate may 
accompany the future exploration of 
the issues we have touched on today 
will be conducted in an objective, ra-
tional, and constructive manner that 
will increase, not diminish, respect for 
the Constitution." 
It is said that law and sausages are 
two things one should never see be-
ing made. I have tried to show why 
the practical deficiencies of constitu-
tional adjudication make it a clumsy 
tool for formulating bioethical policy 
and why those deficiencies may help 
explain a painfully unsatisfying opin-
ion. But is not all law-making just as 
unappetizing? I have several responses. 
First, my purpose here has been to 
correct a common over-estimate of 
the purity of the judicial process. Sec-
ond, I believe that the full battery of 
policymaking institutions--appointed 
commissions, administrative regula-
tions, legislative hearings and debates, 
common-law adjudication, and refer-
enda-together work better than con-
stitutional policymaking. These proc-
esses are better situated to assemble 
and analyze information and to de-
velop acceptable programs. And, un-
like constitutional policymaking, 
none of these processes is effectively 
fmal. Most of all, these processes are 
more consonant with democratic gov-
ernment. In recent decades, we have 
been reconsidering our ideas about 
death as the legal rules concerning 
abortion, brain death, and terminat-
ing treatment have changed. As-
sisted suicide is a serious step in this 
necessarily troubling process. It is a 
question too important to cede to 
courts. 
